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Recent research suggests that many imagined future events are not represented in isolation, 
but instead are embedded in broader event sequences—referred to as event clusters. It remains 
unclear, however, whether the production of event clusters reflects the underlying 
organizational structure of prospective thinking or whether it is an artifact of the event-cuing 
task in which participants are explicitly required to provide chains of associated future events. 
To address this issue, the present study examined whether the occurrence of event clusters in 
prospective thought is apparent when people are left to think freely about events that might 
happen in their personal future. The results showed that the succession of events participants 
spontaneously produced when envisioning their future frequently included event clusters. This 
finding provides more compelling evidence that prospective thinking involves higher-order 
autobiographical knowledge structures that organize imagined events in coherent themes and 
sequences. 
 






The ability to envision one’s personal future is an important aspect of human cognition 
that has recently sparked a surge of interest in psychology and neuroscience (Schacter et al., 
2012; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007; Szpunar, 2010). Several lines of research converge to 
show that the capacity to imagine future events is intimately related to the capacity to 
remember past events, suggesting that both mental activities are supported, at least in part, by 
common memory representations and processes (for review, see e.g., D’Argembeau, 2012; 
Schacter et al., 2012; Szpunar, 2010). This has led to the proposal that the imagination of 
future events involves the extraction of information stored in episodic memory (i.e., details 
about past experiences, such as previously encountered objects, people, locations, and so on) 
and the flexible recombination of this information to construct novel scenarios (Schacter & 
Addis, 2007; see also Hassabis & Maguire, 2007; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007).  
While there is now substantial evidence that episodic memory plays a key role in the 
elaboration of future scenarios, there are reasons to believe that other representational 
structures, such as semantic memory and conceptual knowledge, are also involved in this 
process. First, people frequently think about their personal future in abstract ways (e.g., by 
envisioning general goals and events; Anderson & Dewhurst, 2009; D’Argembeau, Renaud, 
& Van der Linden, 2011) and often access abstract knowledge about their future first when 
they attempt to imagine specific situations that might possibly happen to them (D’Argembeau 
& Mathy, 2011). Second, the construction of future event representations relies to a 
substantial extent on schematic knowledge (Berntsen & Bohn, 2010; Rubin, 2013). Third, 
patients with semantic dementia present with difficulties in constructing detailed 
representations of their personal future (Duval et al., 2012; Irish, Addis, Hodges & Piguet 
2012). Fourth, neuroimaging studies have shown that the imagination of future events recruits 
a specific set of frontal, parietal, and temporal regions (e.g., Addis, Wong & Schacter, 2007; 
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Okuda et al., 2003; Szpunar, Watson & McDermott, 2007; for review, see Schacter et al., 
2012), and some of these regions are consistently involved in semantic processing tasks 
(Binder, Desai, Graves, & Conant, 2009). Taken together, these different lines of research 
suggest that conceptual knowledge structures contribute to the construction of future event 
representations. Furthermore, it has recently been found that many future events are not 
represented in isolation, but instead are causally and/or thematically related to other future 
events (D’Argembeau & Demblon, 2012). This suggests that future thinking involves higher-
order autobiographical knowledge structures that link and organize imagined events in 
broader themes and causal sequences. In the present study, we focus on this organizational 
structure of prospective thinking. 
To date, the role of conceptual autobiographical knowledge in organizing future 
thoughts has been mainly inferred from studies that used an event-cuing task to elicit future 
event representations (D’Argembeau & Demblon, 2012). In such a task, descriptions of 
autobiographical representations of specific events (memories or future thoughts) are used to 
cue other memories or future events, and the relational dimensions that characterize each 
event pair are then evaluated (Brown & Schopflosher, 1998; Brown, 2005; D’Argembeau & 
Demblon, 2012; Wright & Nunn, 2000). Using this task, we have recently found that pairs of 
imagined future events frequently involve an event cluster, meaning that the two events are 
causally related, member of the same broader event, or nested within one another 
(D’Argembeau & Demblon, 2012). While this finding suggests that many future thoughts are 
not represented in isolation but instead are organized in overarching event sequences, it 
remains possible that the occurrence of event clusters is in part an artifact of the event-cuing 
task (Mace, Clevinger & Martin 2010). In this task, participants are indeed explicitly 
instructed to produce pairs of related events and it could therefore be the case that the 
observed associations between the members of an event pair are produced ad hoc in response 
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to the constraints of the procedure (rather than reflecting the operation of pre-existing 
knowledge structures that would organize the construction of imagined events). It thus 
remains to be investigated whether the postulated involvement of higher-order 
autobiographical knowledge in prospective thinking can be evidenced in less constrained 
tasks that do not explicitly require participants to provide chains of associated future events.  
The aim of this study was to further investigate the organization of prospective 
thoughts by dissecting people’s spontaneous mode of thinking about events that might happen 
in their personal future. Asking people to think freely about events from their personal past 
during a think-aloud procedure and subsequently analyzing their productions has proven 
extremely useful for determining what kinds of representations are involved in 
autobiographical memory and how they are organized (Barsalou, 1988). Here, we adapted this 
procedure to ask people to think freely about events that might happen in their personal 
future, and we examined whether the succession of events they produced followed a logical 
order and comprised event clusters. The occurrence of event clusters in freely generated 
future events would indeed provide more compelling evidence for the operation of general 
autobiographical knowledge structures in the organization of prospective thinking.  
Another aim of this study was to examine whether and how the temporal distance of 
the envisioned future time period affects people’s spontaneous mode of future thinking. 
Previous studies have shown that temporal distance can not only influence the way events are 
represented, with distant events being represented with more abstract features and less 
concrete details than close events (D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004; Trope & 
Liberman, 2003), but also the way they are organized, with distant events being more 
frequently part of event clusters (D’Argembeau & Demblon, 2012). This might reflect the 
operation of long-term goals, which would play a key role in structuring prospective thought 
(D’Argembeau & Demblon, 2012). In these previous studies, however, imagined future 
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events were elicited in response to particular cues in the present study we aimed to investigate 
whether the effects of temporal distance are similar when the imagination of future events is 
less constrained. 
 Finally, we also sought to explore the contribution of language in the formation of 
event clusters in future thought. Although previous research has shown that people frequently 
use inner speech when imagining and planning for future events (Morin, Uttl, & Hamper, 
2011; D’Argembeau et al., 2011), little is known about the exact function of language in 
prospective thinking (but see Corballis, 2008, for further discussion of this question). 
According to dual coding theory (Paivio, 1991), language and other forms of mental 
representations such as visual imagery serve distinct purposes: while visual imagery allows 
the simultaneous representation of multiple informational units, language contributes to 
organize units in structured sequences. Following this view, we predicted that language (in 
particular, inner speech) would play a key role in the organization of future thoughts, as 
revealed by the occurrence of event clusters.  
 
2. Method 
2.1. Participants  
Forty young adults (mainly students at the University of Liège) volunteered to take part in 
the study (20 females) and were allocated to either the near future condition or the distant 
future condition. Their age was comprised between 18 and 26 years with a mean of 23 years 
(SD = 2.4) in the near future condition, and between 20 and 26 years with a mean of 23.65 
years (SD = 1.75) in the distant future condition. 
2.2. Material and procedure  
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Participants were instructed to report everything that came to their mind (i.e., to “think 
aloud”; Fox, Ericsson, & Best, 2011) while thinking about events that might happen to them 
in the near future or the more distant future, depending on the condition. The instructions, 
which were adapted from Barsalou (1988), were as follows: “What we would like you to do is 
to think about your future and to describe events that you think will occur during the next 
week (near future condition) / next year (distant future condition) (e.g., things that you have 
planned to do or events that will likely happen to you). Simply describe these events orally, as 
they come to mind. Describe all that goes through your mind, in the order in which it comes 
to your mind, when you think about these events. Continue in this way for approximately 5 
minutes.” The participants’ descriptions were audiorecorded and the experimenter wrote a 
short description of each reported event for use in the next phases of the study. Immediately 
following the think-aloud task, participants were asked to think back to all the events they had 
described and to consider whether these events followed a logical order and whether they 
were linked in some way. They also rated the extent to which, overall, they thought about the 
events using visual images and words; both dimensions were assessed using a 7-point Likert 
scale (1 = not at all, 7 = very much). 
Next, the experimenter read a short description of each event that had been generated 
during the think-aloud task, and participants had to estimate the time when this event will 
likely occur (in days and hours in the near future condition; in months, days and hours in the 
distant future condition); if the time of the event was not determined, they simply wrote 
“undetermined”. Then, participants rated each event on several 7-point Likert scales: they 
rated the extent to which the event came to their mind in the form of visual images (1 = not at 
all, 7 = very much), the extent to which it came to their mind in the form of words (1 = not at 
all, 7 = very much), whether they had thought about this event in the past (1 =  not at all, 7 = 
very often), the likelihood that it will happen (1 = very low, 7 = very high), its estimated 
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frequency of occurrence (1 = will occur only once, 7 = will happen many times), its 
importance (1 =  not at all important, 7 = very important), and emotional valence (-3 = very 
negative, 0 = neutral, 3 = very positive). Participants also mentioned whether or not the event 
was part of their goals (or described a means to attain one of their goals) by answering “yes” 
or “no”.  
Finally, participants were asked to determine whether and how the successive events 
they had described were related to each other. The event descriptions were presented in pairs 
comprising two successive events (such that the second event of one pair became the first 
event of the next pair). For each pair of events, participants were asked to assess whether the 
two events were linked (1) by a causal relation (one was the consequence of the other), (2) by 
an inclusion relation (one was part of the other), (3) whether they were part of a more general 
event, and whether they involved (4) the same person(s), (5) the same location, and/or (6) the 
same activity. These questions were adapted from those used by Brown and Schopflocher 
(1998) to identify the presence of event clusters (see also D’Argembeau & Demblon, 2012).  
Before the think-aloud task, participants were asked to rate their current emotional 
state using the Positive and Negative Affective Scale (Watson, Clark & Tellegen, 1988; 
French adaptation by Gaudreau, Sanchez & Blondin, 2006), a 20-item questionnaire assessing 
positive (e.g., attentive, enthusiastic) and negative (e.g., guilty, nervous) emotions. At the end 
of the experiment, they also completed the Individual Differences Questionnaire (Paivio & 
Harshman, 1983; French adaptation by Grebot, 2000), a 86-item questionnaire measuring 
imaginal and verbal thinking habits and skills (e.g., “I find it easy to visualize the faces of 
people I know”; “I have no difficulty in expressing myself verbally”). These scales were 
administered to explore potential individual differences in the characteristics of future 




2.3. Scoring  
The specificity of reported events was scored by two independent judges on the basis of audio 
recording transcriptions. First, each event was scored as specific, categorical/repeated, or 
extended (see e.g., Barsalou, 1988). A specific event was defined as an event that happens at a 
specific place and time and that contains enough information to be individualized (e.g., “I will 
go to the cinema with Jenny watching The Hobbit tomorrow”). An event was scored as 
categorical/repeated when it involved a category of events, without any detail that would 
individualize the event (e.g., “I will go to the cinema”). Finally, an event was scored as 
extended when it referred to something happening over more than one day (e.g., “my friends 
and I plan to go in Germany next weekend”). Inter-rater agreement was good, with Cohen’s 
kappa = 0.81 in the near future condition and 0.85 in the distant future condition. 
We also scored the thematic contents of the events, using the following categories: (1) 
work and school, (2) social relations, (3) routine activities (e.g., cooking, running errands, and 
so on), (4) leisure activities, and (5) other (when the event did not fit into any of the preceding 
categories). Inter-rater agreement was good, with Cohen’s kappa = 0.85 in the near future 
condition and 0.97 in the distant future condition. 
 
3. Results 
Participants in the near future condition reported a total of 281 events, with an average 
of 14 events per participant (SD = 5.92), and participants in the distant future condition 
reported a total of 201 events, with an average of 10 events per participant (SD = 4.48); in the 
distant future condition, an additional 16 responses were excluded from the analyses because 
they involved the description of an abstract goal rather than a future event (e.g., “I expect to 
be more active in the environmental cause”). The number of reported events was significantly 
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higher for participants who envisioned the next week than for those who envisioned the next 
year, t(38) = 2.41,  p = 0.02, d = 0.78.  
When asked to report whether the events they imagined followed some logic or were 
linked to each other in some way, participants spontaneously identified the following 
organizational dimensions: chronological order, thematic lines, causal relations, urgency or 
importance of events, goals, and routines. For each these dimensions, we computed the 
number of participants who reported this dimension, which is shown in Figure 1 for the two 
time periods. As can be seen, the dimensions that were most frequently identified by 
participants were chronological order and thematic lines, for both the near future and the 
distant future. In addition, participants in the distant future condition frequently estimated that 
the reported events were organized according to goals. Fisher exact probability tests showed 
that events were more frequently organized in terms of goals in the distant future condition 
than in the near future condition (p = 0.04), while there were no significant differences 
between the two conditions for the other dimensions (all ps > 0.05).  
 
Fig. 1: Organizational dimensions of prospective thoughts reported by participants for the two time 
periods. 
 

































As many participants spontaneously identified chronological order as an important factor 
organizing the production of future events, we further investigated whether the reported 
events indeed followed a chronological order. To do so, we examined, for each participant 
and for each event, whether or not the date when a given event was thought to occur (as 
estimated by the participant) was further away in the future than the date of the immediately 
preceding event in the reported event sequence. The frequency of events that followed such a 
forward chronological order was 80% (SD = 18%) in the near future condition and 62% (SD = 
24%) in the distant future condition. The difference between the two temporal periods was 
statistically significant, t(38) = 2.69, p = 0.01, d = 0.87. 
In a similar vein, we examined the extent to which successive events involved a common 
theme. To do so, we computed, for each participant and each event, whether or not the theme 
of a given event (as categorized by the judges; see Method) was the same as the theme of the 
immediately preceding event in the reported event sequence; successive events for which 
thematic content was scored as “other” were not included in this analysis. The frequency of 
events that involved the same theme as the previously imagined event was 32% (SD = 18%) 
in the near future condition and 31% (SD = 21%) in the distant future condition; the 
difference between conditions was not significant, t(38) = 0.09, p = 0.93, d = 0.03.  
3.1. Characteristics of future event representations 
The percentages of specific, categorical/repeated, and extended events reported in the 
two conditions are shown in Figure 2. Participants who envisioned the next week reported 
more repeated-categorical events, t(38) = 8.23, p < 0.001, d = 2.67, more specific events, t(38) 
= 3.65, p < 0.001, d = 1.18, and fewer extended events, t(38) = -12.03, p < 0.001, d = 3.90, 
than participants who envisioned the next year.  
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Fig. 2: Mean frequencies (and standard errors) of specific, repeated-categorical, and extended events for 
the two time periods. 
 
Note: NF: near future; DF: distant future. 
 
The thematic content of events reported in the near future and distant future conditions 
are shown in Table 1. A series of t-tests showed that the frequency of events belonging to 
each thematic content category did not differ significantly between the two conditions, except 
for the category “other” which was more frequent in the distant future condition (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1: Types of thematic contents of prospective thoughts for the two time periods. 







SD t(38) p d 
Work/School 43.50 19.17  42.17 18.81 0.22 0.83 0.07 
Relations 15.39 11.32  10.28 10.34 1.49 0.14 0.48 
Hobbies 21.18 14.88  25.40 16.68 -0.84 0.40 0.27 
Routine 16.35 12.97  9.45 11.46 1.78 0.08 0.58 
Other 3.57 6.95  12.69 14.18 -2.59 0.01 0.84 
 
 
The future events’ characteristics as assessed by the 7-point Likert scales are shown in 
Table 2. Representations of future events involved a high amount of visual images and a 

























conditions.1 In both conditions, participants reported events they had previously thought about 
and the envisioned events were judged as having a high likelihood of occurrence. The 
estimated frequency with which the events would likely occur in the future was higher in the 
near future condition than in the distant future condition. On the other hand, the personal 
importance of the events was higher for the distant future compared to the near future. There 
was also a tendency for distant future events to refer to personal goals more frequently than 
near future events, although the difference just failed to reach statistical significance. Finally, 
on average, the reported events had a positive valence, with no difference between the two 
conditions in this respect. 
 








ᵃ Mean and standard deviation of frequencies (%) of “yes” responses. 
 
  
                                                             
1 When considering the entire set of produced events as a whole (cf. the global ratings obtained before 
each event was individually assessed; see Method), participants also estimated that they used visual 
imagery to a large extent (near future: M = 5.15, SD = 1.22; distant future: M = 4.40, SD = 1.53) and 
words to a moderate extent (near future: M = 3.15, SD = 1.39; distant future: M = 3.35, SD = 1.56) for 
representing the events. The amount of visual images tended to be higher in the close future condition 
than in the distant future condition, although the difference was not statistically significant, t(38) = 
1.71, p = 0.09, d = 0.55, and the two conditions did not differ regarding the amount of words, t(38) = -
0.43, p = 0.67, d = 0.14. 
 Near future  Distant future    
Dimensions Mean SD  Mean SD t(38) p d 
Visual pictures 5.02 1.05  4.85 1.28 0.46 0.65 0.15 
Words 3.09 1.49  2.95 1.16 0.33 0.74 0.11 
Thought before 4.54 0.96  4.75 1.10 -0.63 0.53 0.20 
Likelihood of occur. 5.95 0.45  5.68 0.62 1.58 0.12 0.51 
Frequency 4.69 0.88  3.52 0.94 4.04 <0.001 1.31 
Importance 5.10 0.71  5.67 0.87 -2.28 0.03 0.74 
Emotion 0.99 0.57  1.23 0.73 -1.16 0.25 0.38 
Goalᵃ 70.40 20.56  81.83 17.12 -1.91 0.06 0.62 
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3.2. Event clusters 
Our main aim in this study was to examine whether and how the successive events 
participants had described were related to each other. A total of 261 pairs of successive events 
were produced in the near future condition, with an average of 13 pairs per participant (SD = 
5.92), and a total of 178 pairs of successive events were produced in the distant future 
condition, with an average of 9 pairs per participant (SD = 4.52). Table 3 shows the mean 
frequency and standard deviation of each kind of relational dimension characterizing the pairs 
of events, as assessed by the participants. 
 
Table 3: Prevalence of event clusters for the two time periods. 








SD t(38) p d 
Event clusters 48.03 25.90  65.86 20.91 -2.39 0.02 0.78 
Causality 27.54 16.52  40.61 28.85 -1.76 0.08 0.57 
Inclusion 16.98 17.01  24.77 20.21 -1.32 0.19 0.43 
General event 39.39 29.44  46.29 27.28 -0.77 0.45 0.25 
Common elements 41.13 21.17  43.62 27.57 -0.32 0.75 0.10 
Same person 18.95 14.65  28.37 21.68 -1.61 0.11 0.52 
Same location 21.12 15.88  16.00 12.87 1.12 0.27 0.36 
Same activity 20.59 19.13  28.04 22.51 -1.13 0.27 0.36 
Note: Following Brown and Schopflocher (1998), events were considered to be members of the same 
cluster if the subject indicated that pair members were causally related, member of the same broader 




Following previous studies (Brown & Schopflocher, 1998; D’Argembeau & Demblon, 
2012), events were considered to be members of the same cluster if the participant indicated 
that pair members were causally related, part of the same broader event, or nested within one 
another. As can be seen from Table 3, a substantial proportion of event pairs involved an 
event cluster (in both conditions), and event clusters were significantly more frequent in the 
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distant future condition than in the near future condition.2 For both temporal periods, the most 
frequent dimension characterizing event clusters was the presence of a common broader 
event, followed by causal relations and inclusion relations; there were no significant 
differences between temporal conditions regarding the frequency of these dimensions, 
although causal relations tended to be more frequent for the distant future than for the near 
future. Pairs of events also frequently involved some common element(s), such as the same 
person(s), location, and/or activity, with no differences between the two time periods in this 
respect. In line with previous studies (Brown, 2005; Brown & Schopflocher, 1998), events 
more frequently shared some common element(s) when they were part of an event cluster (the 
mean proportion of events sharing at least one common element was 0.63, SD = 0.29, for 
clustered pairs and 0.22, SD = 0.30, for non-clustered pairs), F(1, 34) = 46.99, p < 0.001, and 
this effect did not interact with the temporal period, F(1, 34) = 1.49, p = 0.233.  
Next, we investigated the extent to which language contributed to the organization of 
future events, as assessed by the different relational dimensions characterizing event clusters. 
To examine this question, the ratings of the amount of words experienced when representing 
each member of an event pair were averaged together and used as a dependent variable in a 
random intercept multilevel model (with event pairs as level 1 units and participants as level 2 
units) with the presence of the relational dimension of interest as a dichotomous predictor 
                                                             
2 As mentioned in the previous section, a substantial number of reported events were not specific and 
instead referred to repeated/categorical or extended events. It could therefore be that the proportion of 
event clusters reported here is overestimated due to the presence of general event representations in the 
reports (see Mace et al., 2010). To address this issue, we investigated the occurrence of event clusters 
for pairs that were constituted of only specific events. Across the two time conditions, 56 pairs were 
composed of two specific events and, among these pairs, the prevalence of event clusters was 61%. 
This indicates that the high prevalence of event clusters reported above cannot simply be explained by 
the presence of general event representations in the reports. 
3 Four participants (one in the near future condition and three in the distant future condition) were 




variable. The results showed that events that were related to each other by a causal relation 
were represented in words to a greater extent than non-causally-related events (coefficient = 
0.287, SE = 0.101, Z = 2.84, p = 0.004); this effect did not interact with the temporal period 
(coefficient = 0.049, SE = 0.202, Z = 0.24, p = 0.81). The amount of words used to represent 
the events was not significantly related to the presence of a common general event (coefficient 
= 0.116, SE = 0.101, Z = 1.15, p = 0.25) or the presence of an inclusion relation (coefficient = 
0.025, SE = 0.119, Z = 0.21, p = 0.83) between members of an event pair. 
 
4. Discussion 
Using an event-cuing task, we recently found that many imagined future events are not 
represented in isolation, but instead are part of event clusters (D’Argembeau & Demblon, 
2012). While this observation suggests that prospective thinking involves higher-order 
autobiographical knowledge structures that link and organize imagined events in broader 
themes and causal sequences, the production of event clusters could simply reflect an artifact 
of the event-cuing task, as participants were explicitly required to provide chains of associated 
future events. To address this issue, the present study examined whether the occurrence of 
event clusters in prospective thought is apparent when people are left to think freely about 
events that might happen in their personal future. The results showed that the succession of 
events participants spontaneously produced when envisioning the next week or the next year 
frequently involved event clusters. Furthermore, the previously observed effect of temporal 
distance on the frequency of event clusters was replicated in the less constrained conditions of 
this study, with event clusters being more frequent when envisioning the distant future than 
when envisioning the near future. Finally, we investigated the role of language in the 
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organization of future thought and found that inner speech was related to the production of 
causal sequences between imagined events.  
Overall, the frequency of event clusters produced in this study (i.e., 48% in the near 
future condition and 66% for the distant future condition) was somewhat lower than the 
frequency of clusters previously observed using the event-cuing task (which ranged from 74% 
to 81%, depending on the envisioned time period; D’Argembeau & Demblon, 2012). The fact 
that the successive events produced in this study often formed clusters is quite remarkable, 
however, given that participants were not explicitly instructed to generate chains of related 
events or to organize their production in any way. Participants were simply instructed to 
describe all that went through their minds, in the order it came to their minds, so there was no 
a priori reason to expect that they would produce event clusters, unless one postulates that 
higher-order autobiographical knowledge structures organize the generation of events. If such 
knowledge structures would not be operating, one would expect that the successive events 
produced by participants would either be unrelated to each other or would share surface 
features (i.e., episodic details, such as the people or location involved), but without forming 
broader themes and causal sequences. Besides the occurrence of event clusters, it is also 
interesting to note that, when asked to consider whether the future events they had imagined 
followed some logic or were linked to each other in some way, many participants 
spontaneously mentioned that the events were organized along thematic lines and followed a 
chronological order. Overall, the present findings thus provide more stringent evidence that 
many imagined future events are not represented in isolation, but instead are organized in 
coherent themes and sequences.  
In line with our previous findings (D’Argembeau & Demblon, 2012), we also found 
that the occurrence of event clusters in prospective thought increased with temporal distance, 
and this was especially so for the occurrence of causal relations between events. Furthermore, 
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participants in the distant future condition spontaneously estimated that the imagined events 
were organized according to personal goals to a greater extent than participants in the near 
future condition. Previous research has shown that goals tend to guide and shape the 
construction of future event representations (Christian, Miles, Fung, Best & Macrae, 2013; 
D’Argembeau & Mathy, 2011). Personal goals may, in particular, contribute to organize 
events in meaningful causal sequences, especially for the distant future (D’Argembeau & 
Demblon, 2012; see also Brown, 2005, for discussion of the role of goals in the formation of 
event clusters for past events). Of course, these results do not preclude the possibility that 
goals play some role in organizing near future thoughts, but other organizing principles may 
be preponderant for that time period. The present study suggests that one such principle is 
chronological order. Many participants spontaneously reported that the succession of events 
they imagined followed a chronological order and, when looking at the dates when each 
envisioned event was expected to occur, we found that 80% of events in the close future 
condition and 62% of events in the distant future condition were indeed reported following a 
forward chronological order. Previous research has shown that temporal order is an important 
organizational dimension in autobiographical memory (e.g., Radvansky, Copeland & Zwaan, 
2005), and the present findings suggest that temporal order also plays a key role in organizing 
prospective thought. The fact that near future thoughts were especially prone to follow a 
forward chronological order may reflect the use of temporal landmarks (i.e., the days of the 
week) as a strategy for envisioning events in the near future. It should also be noted that most 
reported events had already been thought about (as indicated by participants’ ratings), and it 
could be that organizing these event representations in forward temporal order helps to keep 
track of expected events as a function of their imminence.  
When looking at the contribution of language to the organization of prospective 
thought, we found that words were used to a greater extent for representing events that were 
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causally related to each other than for representing non-causally-related events. Previous 
research has shown that inner speech plays an important role in future thinking and, in 
particular, in planning processes: planning is indeed the most frequent self-reported function 
of inner speech (Morin et al., 2011), and future thoughts that serve a planning function are 
frequently represented in the form of words (D’Argembeau et al., 2011; Stawarczyk, Cassol 
& D’Argembeau, 2013). The present findings dovetail nicely with these studies and further 
suggest that language may play some role in making causal connections between imagined 
events. According to Paivio (1991), the verbal system indeed supports the sequential 
organization of ideation, which would not be possible on the basis of mental imagery alone. 
Language and narratives play critical roles in autobiographical memory (Habermas & Bluck, 
2000; Rubin, 2006), and developmental research suggests that language is not simply the way 
in which memories are expressed, but is instrumental in providing an organizational structure 
for remembered events (Fivush & Nelson, 2004). In the same vein, language may provide the 
representational scaffolding that allows one to organize envisioned future events in coherent 
causal sequences that could be used for planning purpose.   
Besides identifying the frequency of event clusters in a relatively unconstrained future 
thinking task, the present study also allowed us to examine the characteristics of individual 
future events and to determine how they vary according to the envisioned time period. 
Participants reported more events in the near future condition (see also D’Argembeau et al., 
2011; Spreng & Levine, 2006), and the expected frequency of occurrence of imagined events 
was rated higher for the near future than for the distant future. In line with previous 
observations (D’Argembeau et al., 2011), near future thoughts involved specific events to a 
greater extent than distant future thoughts. On the other hand, distant future events were rated 
as more important and corresponded in large part to events related to personal goals. These 
results are in accordance with previous research showing that with increasing temporal 
20 
 
distance, envisioned events are more personally relevant (Berntsen & Bohn, 2010; 
Stawarczyk et al., 2013) and conceived in a more abstract and decontextualized form that 
conveys the perceived essence of the events (Trope & Lieberman, 2003). Contrary to previous 
findings (e.g., Berntsen & Bohn, 2010; D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004), we did not 
observe a significant difference between representations of close and distant future events in 
terms of visual imagery. It should be noted, however, that in the present study close and 
distant future events were not matched in terms of specificity, so the comparison of visual 
imagery between the two kinds of events should be taken with caution. Be that as it may, for 
both time periods, participants indicated that events came to a large extent in the form of 
visual images. Visual imagery is an integral component of autobiographical memory and 
future thinking (D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2006; Rubin, 2006); it provides a medium 
for simulating what possible futures would be like, which may in turn orient choices and 
motivate action (Conway, Maeres & Standart, 2004).  
Interestingly, when examining the kinds of general event representations that were 
reported for the two time periods, we found that participants in the near future condition 
mainly reported repeated/categorical events, whereas participants in the distant future 
condition mainly reported extended events. Several factors could explain this difference. First, 
some participants reported that they thought about their daily routine for generating events 
that might happen in the next week, which could in part explain the occurrence of 
repeated/categorical events; on the other hand, no participant reported to have thought about 
daily routines in the distant future condition. Second, given the short time period involved in 
the near future condition (i.e., one week), the opportunity of generating extended events 
(events lasting longer than a day) was necessarily more limited than in the distant future 
condition. Third, and more interestingly, it could be that people spontaneously adapt the 
granularity (degree of precision or scope) of future event representations according to the 
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envisioned temporal period. This could reflect a process of cognitive economy whereby 
summary representations of extended time periods are more prevalent when representing the 
more distant future, while the frequency of representations of specific events that could 
happen during these extended periods increase when they move closer to the present. 
Although this is a plausible hypothesis, the extent to which the temporal granularity/scope of 
future thoughts varies systematically with temporal distance remains to be investigated in 
detail.  
Another question that deserves further study is the role of self-related processes in the 
formation of event clusters. Previous research suggests that personal goals and self-images 
play an important role in the construction and organization of past and future thoughts 
(Brown, 2005; D’Argembeau & Demblon, 2012; D’Argembeau & Mathy, 2001; Rathbone, 
Conway, & Moulin, 2011), but whether or not the occurrence of event clusters is specific to 
autobiographical information remains to be determined. Recent findings indicate that past and 
future thoughts about close others share some features with past and future thoughts about the 
self (while both types of thoughts differ to a larger extent from past and future thoughts about 
non-close others; Grysman, Prabhakar, Anglin & Hudson. 2013). It could thus be the case that 
the organizational principles evidenced here also contribute to structuring event knowledge 
relating to close others, although this possibility awaits empirical scrutiny.  
In conclusion, the present study shows that when asked to freely generate events that 
might happen in their personal future (in whatever order they came to mind), people do not 
produce events in a random manner. Instead, the successive events they report are often 
linked to each other to form broader event sequences. This finding provides new support for 
the view that prospective thinking involves higher-order autobiographical knowledge 
structures that organize imagined events in coherent themes and causal sequences, and our 
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results further suggest that inner speech may play an important role in creating this 
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